Progress in science is presumed to occur through the hypothetico-deductive method. Balanced experimental design and rigorous statistical hypothesis testing control for extraneous factors and focus attention only on the effect of interest (Connor & Simberloff 1986 ). This powerful approach and inferences derived from results of rigorous statistical tests are convincing and effective evaluations of specific effects. Frequently, attempts to test and develop more ecologically benign harvesting techniques and gear need to be evaluated in an experimental context, because it may thereby become evident that such gear and techniques are not ecologically benign. In some cases, the proposed alternative may actually be more environmentally detrimental than current practices. Yet the compelling need to use statistically based hypothesis testing in both basic and applied research may force investigators to design experiments so that statistical significance can be achieved despite considerable ecological effect (Farnsworth & Rosovsky 1993) . For example, in the development of a sea turtle excluder panel for shrimp trawls, any prototypes that allow even a single turtle to enter should be rejected, but the capture of a single individual will never be a statistically significant rejection of a no-effect hypothesis. In these situations, ethical concerns and the practice of common sense should outweigh the relevance of statistical significance.
Other approaches, such as Bayesian inference (Ellison 1996) and decision theory (Poulton 1994) , may be more appropriate in these cases because they provide a mechanism by which to include prior knowledge, and they can establish a priori levels of acceptable perturbation based on common sense and ethical concerns. As scientists, conservation biologists, and resource managers, we should value practical significance (Stevens 1996) and employ ethical reasoning, as well as statistical significance, to evaluate the outcome of our experiments.
I cite an experience of my own in which ethical concerns and the use of common sense outweighed the value of rigorous statistically based hypothesis testing. During the summer of 1998, I conducted a survey of the bank trap crab fishery in the Maryland waters of Chesapeake Bay (Roosenburg 1999) . As part of this study, I was asked to evaluate trap designs that would either prevent nontarget species, particularly air-breathing vertebrates, from entering traps or provide some mechanism for their escape.
Bank traps are a fishing gear used in the Chesapeake Bay blue crab ( Callinectes sapidus ) fishery to catch both hard crabs and peelers (crabs just prior to ecdysis). These traps are similar to a pound net in design, consisting of a hedging set perpendicular to the direction of animal movement. A heart-shaped corral leads organisms into a holding box where the catch remains until the trap is checked. The beginning of the hedging is placed on shore at the mean high tide level, and the entire trap is Ͻ 30 m in length. Because several nontarget species also become entrapped in bank traps, a Maryland regulation requires that an air space extending 30 cm (1 foot) above the mean high tide be built into the holding box to prevent mortality of air-breathing species that might otherwise drown (Code of Maryland Regulations 1998). The nontarget air breathing species caught in bank traps include turtles, sea birds, and mammals (Roosenburg 1999) . As part of my study of the bank traps, I evaluated box designs that would either prevent air-breathing organisms from entrapment or provide a mechanism for their escape. One of the mechanisms that I was asked to test was a holding box that was not enclosed on the top and which therefore allowed air-breathing species to escape from the trap.
Based on my previous experience using bank traps in my research, I suggested that the open top box would present a new peril. Fish-feeding birds, primarily Great Blue Herons ( Ardea herodias ), Cormorants ( Phalacrocorax auritis ), and Ospreys ( Pandion haliaetus ) frequently use holding boxes as resting platforms, and in some cases they fish inside the heart. Previously, I had observed Great Blue Herons trapped and drowned in boxes that had lost their lids. Nonetheless, because the idea of the topless box was suggested by a commercial waterman, I was asked to evaluate its effect on both target and nontarget species. The topless box design was incorporated into a balanced experimental design that evaluated an excluder panel, the topless trap, and control traps. I anticipated that the experiment would last for several weeks to allow accurate evaluation of any effects by rigorous statistical analysis.
Within the first 3 days while I was still setting up the experiment and determining the most efficient manner to collect data, the topless box caught and drowned an Osprey. The topless box allowed the bird to fish in the box, but it was not wide enough to allow the Osprey to spread its wings to fly from the box. Two days following discovery of the first Osprey, a second bird, still alive but weak, was removed, resuscitated, and released. Had I not been alerted to the presence of the Osprey in the trap by a concerned citizen, the second Osprey would have died. The following day a third Osprey was caught and died in a topless box. During seven trap days I caught three Ospreys, whereas in my 10 years previous experience with bank traps, I recall only one case in which an Osprey died in a bank trap that had lost a lid. Although Ospreys are relatively common on the study site, obtaining a statistically significant effect of the topless trap would have dramatically reduced the local Osprey populations. At this point, I removed all the topless boxes from the experiment.
No statistical test would have confirmed a statistically significant effect of the topless trap on the number of Ospreys caught ( G adj ϭ 1.99, df ϭ 1, 0.05 Ͻ p Ͻ 0.25). Unfortunately, the power to arrive at statistical significance in this case could be achieved only when six Ospreys were caught in topless traps ( G adj ϭ 4.07, df ϭ 1, p Ͻ 0.05). Based on the outcome of the analysis, it is clear that the likelihood of a Type II error, failing to reject a false null hypothesis, is high. Common sense, practicality, and ethical concerns dictated that the topless trap was not a viable solution for the air-breathing, nontarget species. Fortunately, I convinced resource managers that the topless box was ineffective, and I discontinued testing it. Had I used a decision theory analytical approach, on the other hand, I could have incorporated practical and ethical concerns into the experimental design (Poulton 1994; Hilborn 1997) .
Decision theory can incorporate previous knowledge of a system into common sense approaches to identifying appropriate resource management strategies (Poulton 1994) . A decision analysis can be set up as a hierarchic series of a priori decisions to identify an appropriate management strategy (Fig. 1) . Such an analysis requires that decisionmakers think about the choices with which they may be confronted before decisions are actually made (Poulton 1994) . Two types of information can be incorporated into a decision tree derived for resource management. First, previous information about the capture method or gear can be incorporated into the decision tree based on opinions of knowledgeable persons in the field, frequently resource users. Second, qualitative information about the species affected can be included, as in a cost-benefit approach (Poulton 1994) .
In my case, previous information would have included discussions with fishermen that use bank traps and their experience that traps without lids occasionally catch birds. Qualitative information would entail assigning a "value" to each species which reflects accepted levels of by-catch, such as zero tolerance for mortality of endangered, threatened, or rare species (Ospreys or other sensitive species) and a higher tolerance for more common species or species not killed or harmed by the fishing practice. A decision tree can be established (Fig. 1) on the basis of these criteria. A priori, the criterion of zero tolerance assumes a hypothesis of no effect with 100% confidence: any deviation from zero would cause rejection of the hypothesis and thus force the choice of a particular branch in the decision tree. In the case of the
Figure 1. A decision tree of a logical sequence of experiments for the bank trap study in Maryland. Any decision should be based on either the capture of zerotolerance species or a cost-benefit analysis that maximizes gain. The first experiment (trap type) evaluates the use of a topless trap (w/, with; w/o, without). The case of the capture of an Osprey, a zero-tolerance species, forces the decision to traps with tops. A subsequent experiment evaluates the effect of an excluder panel on target and nontarget species in traps with tops. Evaluation of the excluder panel could include the use of statistical hypothesis testing in the comparison.
Ospreys caught in the topless trap, the path of the decision is forced to take the branch of traps with tops.
The use of an excluder panel can be evaluated similarly, first for zero-tolerance species and then for lowerranked species. Once a branch in the decision tree is reached at which zero tolerance species are no longer threatened, standard statistical techniques can be employed to compare the effect of the choices on both target and nontarget species. That information can be used in the decision tree as part of a cost-benefit analysis to reach a decision (Poulton 1994) . Because the decisions are guided by a set of criteria that are established a priori, a statistical hypothesis test is not required to make a particular decision; but statistical hypothesis tests can be informative and appropriate whenever sample sizes are sufficient and assumptions of the statistical test are met.
There are two points at which subjectivity can become an issue in a decision analysis of this type. The first is in determining an a priori level of tolerance for mortality for particular species. Environmentalists and resource managers may differ in how they value a particular species. Because in tests of new gear types we are dealing with a known design and purpose instead of an unknown scientific or ecological phenomenon, we should be willing to accept zero tolerance and no deviation from this standard (i.e., zero tolerance would constitute rejection of a no-effect hypothesis with a single event). Second, determining the value of both target and nontarget species can be subjective. For target species this might be associated with the current market value, but for nontarget species assigning value is a much more difficult task and should be considered with extreme care. Perhaps the best decision trees and criteria can be obtained when environmentalists, scientists, and resource managers agree on species' values prior to the initiation of a series of studies. Finally, one benefit of the cost-benefit approach to some decisions is that tradeoffs concerning the gain or loss of target and nontarget species can be assessed from an economic perspective in that small losses of target species may still result in a net gain because of the ecological or economic cost reduction associated with the elimination of bycatch.
My example illustrates how the use of decision analysis can incorporate ethical concerns and common sense in a hypothesis testing approach that can be just as convincing as a statistically significant result. Resource mangers and conservation biologists alike should consider decision theory as a technique for analyzing ecologically sensitive issues (Hilborn 1997) . Noss (1986) and Shraeder-Frechette and McCoy (1992) point out that in applied cases, a Type II error can be more problematic because failing to reject the "no effect" hypothesis could lead to continued use of a detrimental practice. In such cases, the practical significance of the outcome of the experiment is tantamount to statistical significance (Stevens 1996) . Developing an a priori decision tree that includes decision criteria based on common sense, ethical considerations, and a thorough understanding of the species affected could eliminate the need for continued experimentation to statistically reject a "no effect" hypothesis which could result in environmental damage. As scientists, and more important as conservation biologists, we should remain open-minded about alternative analytical techniques and realize that a significant statistical outcome may not always be necessary or possible to support or reject a hypothesis. Of course we should not throw out hypothesis testing, because it is a powerful tool to be employed whenever possible, but in certain situations we should carefully consider the context and environmental effects of our experiments and include analytical techniques that can incorporate common sense and ethical rationality.
